Opinion
France And Its Permanent Colonies
Published
1 year agoon
By Toyin Falola
France ruined Haiti, the first black country to become independent in 1804. France is on the course to ruining all its former African colonies. It is no coincidence that the recent spate of coups in Africa has manifested in former French African colonies (so-called Francophone Africa), once again redirecting the global spotlight on France’s activities in the region. And that the commentaries, especially amongst Africans, have been most critical of France and its continued interference in the region.
This is coming at the backdrop of France’s continuous meddling in the economic and political affairs of “independent” Francophone countries, an involvement which has seen it embroiled, both directly and indirectly, in a series of unrests, corruption controversies and assassinations that have bedevilled the region since independence. Unlike Britain and other European countries with colonial possessions in Africa, France never left—at least not in the sense of the traditional distance observed since independence by the other erstwhile colonial overlords. Instead, it has, under the cover of a policy of coopération (cooperation) within the framework of an extended “French Community,” continued to maintain a perceptible cultural, economic, political and military presence in Africa.
On the surface, the promise of coopération between France and its former colonies in Africa—which presupposes a relationship of mutual benefit between politically independent nations—where the former would, through the provision of technical and military assistance, lead the development/advancement of its erstwhile colonial “family,” is both commendable and perhaps even worthy of emulation. However, when this carefully scripted façade is juxtaposed with the reality that has unfolded over the decades, what is revealed is an extensive conspiracy involving individuals at the highest levels of the French government. Along with other influential business interests—also domiciled in France—they have worked with a select African elite to orchestrate the most extensive and heinous crimes against the people of today’s Francophone Africa. A people who, even today, continues to strain under the weight of France’s insatiable greed.
The greed and covetousness that drove the European nations to abandon trade for colonialisation in Africa is alive today as it was in the 1950s and 1980s. The decision to give in to African demands for independence was not the outcome of any benevolence or civilized reason on the part of Europe but for economic and political expedience. Thus, when the then President of France, Charles de Gaulle—who nurtured an ambition to see France maintain its status as a world power—agreed to independence for its African colonies, it was only a pre-emptive measure to check the further loss of French influence on the continent. In other words, the political liberation offered “on a platter of gold,” as a means to avoid the development of other costly wars of independence which, a World War II depleted, France was already fighting in Indochina and Algeria.
Independence was, thus, only the first step in ensuring the survival of French interests in Africa and, more importantly, its prioritization. Pursuant to this objective, De Gaulle also proposed a “French Community”—delivered on the same “golden platter”—as a caveat to continued French patronage. As such, the over ninety-eight per cent of its colonies which agreed to be part of this community were roped into signing coopération accords—covering economic, political, military and cultural sectors—by Jacques Foccart, a former intelligence member of the French Resistance in the Second World War, handpicked by De Gaulle. This signing of coopération accords between France and the colonies, which opted to be part of its post-independence French Community’ marked the beginning of France’s neo-colonial regime in Africa, where Africans got teachers and despotic leaders in exchange for their natural resources and French military installations.
Commonly referred to as Françafrique—a pejorative derivation from Felix Houphouet Boigny’s “France-Afrique,” describing the close ties between France and Africa—France’s neo-colonial footprint in Africa has been characterized by allegations of corruption and other covert activities perpetrated through various Franco-African economic, political and military networks. An essential feature of Françafrique is the crookish mafia-like relations between French leaders and their African counterparts, which was reinforced by a dense web of personal networks. On the French side, African ties, which had been French presidents’ domaine réservé (sole responsibility) since 1958, was run by an “African cell” founded and managed by Jacques Foccart. Comprising French presidents, powerful influential members of the French business community and the French secret service, this cell operated outside the purview of the French parliament, its civil society organization, and non-governmental organisations. This created a window for corruption, as politicians and state officials took part in business arrangements, which amounted to state racketeering.
Whereas pro-French sentiments in Africa, and without, still argue for France’s continuous presence and contributions, particularly in the area of military intervention and economic aid, which they say have been critical to security, political stability and economic survival in the region, such arguments intentionally play down the historical consequences of French interests in the region. Enjoying a free reign in the region—backed mainly by the United States and Britain since the Cold War—France used the opportunity to strengthen its hold on its former colonies. This translated into the development of a franc zone—a restrictive monetary policy tying the economies of Francophone countries to France—as well as the adoption of an active interventionist approach, which has produced over 120 military interventions across fourteen dependent states between 1960 and the 1990s. These interventions, which were either to rescue stranded French citizens, put down rebellions, prevent coups, restore order, or uphold French-favoured regimes, have rarely been about improving the fortunes of the general population of Francophone Africa. French interventions have maintained undemocratic regimes in Cameroun, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, and Niger. At the same time, its joint military action in Libya was responsible for unleashing Islamic terrorism threatening to engulf countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.
In pursuit of its interests in Africa, France has made little secret of its contempt for all independent and populist reasons while upholding puppet regimes. In Guinea in 1958, De Gaulle embarked on a ruthless agenda to undermine the government of Ahmed Sékou Touré—destroying infrastructure and flooding the economy with fake currency—for voting to stay out of the French Community. This behaviour was again replicated in Togo, where that country’s first president, Sylvio Olympio, was overthrown and gruesomely murdered for daring to establish a central bank for the country outside the Franc CFA Zone. Subsequently, his killer, Gnassingbé Eyadema, assumed office and ruled from 1967 till his death in 2005—after which he was succeeded by his son, who still rules. In Gabon, you had the Bongo family, who ran a regime of corruption and oppression with the open support of France throughout 56 years of unproductive rule. As for Cameroun’s most promising, pan-Africanist pro-independence leader, Felix Moumie, died under mysterious circumstances in Switzerland, paving the way for the likes of Paul Biya, who has been president since 1982. France also backs a Senegalese government, which today holds over 1500 political prisoners, and had singlehandedly installed Alhassan Ouattara as president of Cote d’Ivoire.
Therefore, the widespread anti-France sentiment spreading through the populations of Francophone Africa and beyond is not unfounded, as it has become apparent to all and sundry that these countries have not fared well under the shadow of France. In Niger, where France carried out one of the bloodiest campaigns of colonial pacification in Africa—murdering and pillaging entire villages—and which is France’s most important source of uranium, the income per capita was 59 per cent lower in 2022 than it was in 1965. In Cote d’Ivoire, the largest producer of cocoa in the world, the income per capita was 25 per cent lower in 2022 than in 1975. Outside the rampant unemployment, systematic disenfranchisement and infrastructural deficits that characterize these Francophone countries, there’s also the frustration and anger of sitting back to watch helplessly. In contrast, the wealth of your country is being carted away to nations whose people feed fat on your birth right and then turn around to make judgements and other disparaging comments on your humanity and condition of existence. The people are tired of being poor, helpless and judged as third-world citizens! France is a dangerous country.
It is indeed overdue for France to cut its losses—whatever it envisages they are—and step back from its permanent colonies to allow the people of Francophone Africa to decide on their preferred path to the future. After nearly 200 years of take, the people have had good reasons to say France should leave. The restlessness and the coups that have become commonplace in the region are symptoms of deeper underlying social, economic and political problems, including weak institutions, systematic disenfranchisement, poverty, corruption and/or misappropriation of national wealth. And as we call on France to do the honourable thing and withdraw, we should also rebuke Africa’s leaders who have not only put their interests above that of their people but have also turned the instruments of regional intervention and development (like the AU and ECOWAS) into tools for ensuring their political survival.
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Opinion
Bringing Political Science Back Into Public Administration Praxis In Nigeria
Published
10 hours agoon
January 22, 2025By Tunji Olaopa
When the politics-administration dichotomy inaugurated the practice of public administration, what was intended was a critical need to bifurcate the logic of the two in ways that will extend the relationship between the politicians and the administrator and make it more efficient. The politician is then, within the logic of the dichotomy, restricted to policy formulation while the administrator is confined to the realm of policy implementation. Reality, however, defeats the neat boundary between the two. Politics and administration, in practical reality, are almost inseparable. And one would expect that the relationship between political science and public administration discourse will reflect this inseparability. Unfortunately, it does not. The separation undermines the fundamental urgency of addressing the political foundation of administrative research and practices, especially as they relate to the issues of power, governance, politics and democracy.
Political science descriptively and critically studies political phenomena and how they contribute to our understanding of the political community. Significantly, political science analyzes the fundamental role that power plays in the articulation of politics especially in the attempt to unravel the dynamics of the political community and its social and political circumferences and trajectories. Public administration is the very embodiment of the state as the most critical embodiment of politics. The state is made most visible within the frameworks and institutional workings of public administration, especially through the public sector and the public services. The straightforward argument is that the political and administrative reality of any state cannot be studied in isolation of each other. This seems obvious enough given that each of political science and public administration reinforces each other in terms of shedding light on the complex and intricate workings of the state and its response to the citizens and the commonwealth. In other words, there is no way the concepts of power and governance, for example, would not intersect political and administrative questions, and complicate them. The issues of democratic governance and innovation, and collaborative governance demand thinking of the interplay between politics science and administration.
In my many years as a deep insider career bureaucrat in the public service, I have been aware not only of the role that politics plays in administrative matters, and vice versa. I have also been apprised of how political acts of commission and omission actively promote or undermine the public service. Indeed, my theoretical and practical researches into the dynamics of government business and institutional reforms highlight how political and administrative factors interact. My deep worry, however, is that political science and public administration discourses in Nigeria carry on as if these interactions and interrelations are at best trivial or at worst non-existent. For instance, in institutional terms, there is nothing to write home about in the existence and possible cross-fertilizing relationship between the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) and the National Association for Public Administration and Management (NAPAM). Indeed, there cannot be such a cross-fertilization because while NPSA is active, NAPAM has remained comatose. And the vision and mission statement of NPSA is not broad enough to take in administrative matters and concerns, or the interplay of politics and administration.
The most fundamental observation that my status as a scholar-bureaucrat in the federal civil service afforded me is a practical understanding of the nature of the fundamental disconnections in public administration practices and the consequences on the state’s responsibility to her citizens, all due to crucial assumptions and principles that have been left lying fallow and unattended to in an interdisciplinary discourse and cross fertilization between political science scholarship and public administration theories and practice. A few examples suffice. In 1966, Nigeria shifted away from the parliamentary system of government and, after the long interregnum of military administrations, resumed with the presidential system, enshrined in the 1979 Constitution. This move was preceded by the Dotun Phillips studies report of 1985, and the Civil Service Reorganization Decree of 1988, which aligned the civil service with the presidential system of government. However, even with the reversal of the reform frameworks by the Ayida reform of 1995, it is still clear that many of Nigeria’s administrative practices retain aspects of parliamentary elements that could be one source of unresolved structural troubles necessitating performance inefficiency.
This has some other implications for the practice of federalism and the stabilization of Nigeria’s governance structure. Since the intervention of the military in 1966 and the subsequent militarization of Nigeria’s political and governance structure of the Nigerian state, the federal arrangement that ought to have been the natural remedy for the unruly ethno-national diversity became compromised. For instance, inter-governmental relations and the critical need for fiscal federalism became caught in the cracks of constitutional and institutional dysfunction. The Babangida administration, through the recommendation of the IBB’s Presidential Advisory Committee, established the National Council for Inter-Governmental Relations (NCIS) as one in a series of government’s efforts—like the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS), National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies, Michael Imoudu National Institute for Labour Studies, etc.—to rehabilitate Nigeria’s governance and administrative structures.
All this goes to demonstrate a cogent reason why the political and the administrative in Nigeria’s governance context cannot be separated, even in terms of theoretical argumentation. Political science scholarship, in longing for an interdisciplinary relationship with public administration, must recognize how the latter has evolved first as a sub-discipline of political science, and later as a multidisciplinary endeavor that encompasses insights drawn from management science, organizational psychology, sociology, statistics, industrial engineering, computer science, etc. from which it draws to invigorate its curriculum and pedagogy. This point is still not demonstrated in the disciplinary silos that define the existence of political science on the one hand and public administration on the other in Nigerian universities. In some universities, public administration functions in a different faculty, or is its own faculty, as different from the faculty of the social sciences. And so, scholars carry out their scholarly discourses in different contexts, oblivious of the grave challenges that the Nigerian administrative and governance predicament poses to their theoretical and practical separation. In what follows, I will point attention at a few contentious institutional matters to which I have gestured in many of my works, but which I contend require the critical interrogation of political scientists.
First, there is the recurrent issue of the need to keep clarifying the nature and the role of the state in terms of administrative efficiency. While the state is central to the analysis of power, and constitutes one of the central thematic focuses of political science scholarship, the fundamental need to redefine the role of the state has often not been taken up in terms of its significance for the restructuring of the ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that are the critical engine room for measuring the developmental successes of the state. Aligning the role of the state to the understanding of the MDA becomes crucial as it facilitates the reform of the MDAs in terms of the need to remodel and strengthen their core vis-à-vis their non-core functions as both relate to the service delivery function of government. This could also instigate the urgency of conducting institutional audit that is crucial not only to determining the performance status of many state agencies, but to also jumpstart organizational development dynamics that are meant to motivate the movement of structures to institutions. It is institutions, rather than mere structures that government requires to undermine governance failure.
Second, political science scholarship in Nigeria is necessarily confronted by the need to clarify and explicate the thorny issue of the relationship between the administrative operational dynamics of the executive arm of government in terms of its apparatuses—like the Federal Executive Council—and the working of the American-styled presidential system of government. This is a key concern given that Nigeria’s adoption of many institutional dynamics has remained problematic in terms of relating them to her political and administrative realities. For instance, acute and critical attention needs to be paid also to the political economy involved in the executive-legislature relations, and the implications deriving from the planning and budgeting processes from legislative oversight to appropriation and budget implementation.
Peter Ekeh’s analysis of migrated structures alerts us to the danger of adopting these structures without paying critical attention to their value orientation and the political realities of where they are coming from. Democratic governance and all its ancillary structural and administrative apparatuses encompass a host of issues that require critical analyses. Since the notion of the public good and the commonwealth, in the idea of good democratic governance, constitutes the formidable core of the relationship between politics, public management and public administration, then the discourse around stakeholder management, participatory governance, performance management and accountability becomes key and critical core issues that interact with the way we see politics, administration and citizenship. The recent discourse on the resuscitation of local governance, through the landmark decision of the Supreme Court to legally reinvigorate the constitutional strength of local government in Nigeria, points at the significance of connecting community development structures and traditional institutions to the state systems and democratic enablement through the principle of social capital and subsidiarity.
To reiterate, the predicament of the postcolonial Nigerian state demands that political science scholarship must necessarily and urgently signal an interdisciplinary collaboration that will instigate a ferment of theoretical, practical and institutional discourses from which both can expect not only to refresh their internal discursive vibrancy, but also collectively contribute to the understanding of the working of the Nigerian state and her capacity to induce participatory democratic governance.
. Olaopa is Professor of Public Administration, and the Chairman,Federal Civil Service Commission, Abuja.
Opinion
Reflections On Moghalu’s Voice On African Leadership (2)
Published
11 hours agoon
January 22, 2025By Toyin Falola
For a long time, the response of Africans to leadership paralysis that is almost consuming the continent has been very reactionary and not necessarily proactive. With no exemption of any African country in particular, the crops of leaders that one would find at every position of leadership are individuals with sufficient demonstration of unpreparedness as they either have demonstrated no creative approach to the myriads of challenges confronting the continent or they are predominantly ideologically helpless in solving them. Their futile attempts to project some effectively planned strategies to tackle their existential challenges have indicated that they either do not have a mind or are grossly inefficient in handling the task ahead of them. Usually, what happens is that they believe in a one-size-fits-all approach. Therefore, they have traditionally dedicated themselves to extracting practices adopted elsewhere, disregarding the contextual import of such ideas. In essence, most African countries continue to find themselves in the intractable challenges that are byproduct of the superficial political aesthetics of others and do not invest in thinking their way out of the problems that face their people. They are an incurable believer that Africans are themselves deficient in independent thoughts and cannot produce refined intellectual ideas that would be used to salvage their internal challenges. But then, this trend would not go on forever.
Now that some foresighted African leaders are putting their thoughts together to create such an academic institution as the African School of Governance, it reveals their awareness about the underlying duties that have been abandoned for a long time due to the inability to face the challenges head-on. They concluded that giving reactionary solutions to Africa’s challenges would only tilt another way for the misdirection of African youths for many generations. Such youths, I’m afraid, would only be competent in following the Global North in whatever decisions they take, not minding if the universalist decisions and solutions can address their local issue.
Refined intellectuals like Professor Moghalu, who has been appointed as the maiden President of the ASG, promise to introduce a profound style of handling intending African leaders who would eventually occupy important positions where ideas and values to be used in governance would be theirs and not parodied along their colonizer’s paths. Over the years, it has become common knowledge that anyone who has economic power, questionable as the source of their affluence, always contests for political offices where ordinarily refined ideas are needed to maximum impact. It does not matter if they are utterly bereft of values and initiatives that can provoke cutting-edge and remarkable progress; what is prioritized is that they are given the mandate to represent even when they do not know how.
This is the foundation of the motivation that pushed these outstanding individuals to develop the initiative that brought ASG into existence. Across many African countries, especially in modern times, unconfirmed information suggests that people who have amassed through diabolical sources are either found picking interest in political positions or make themselves kingmakers who sponsor others that would occupy these positions. If this is the case, which is highly likely, one cannot but wonder where the future of African politics would be driven. This suspicion and anxiety cannot be unnecessary considering the discovery that in places where these individuals of questionable moral character find themselves in political offices, they have done extensively well to major in inanities and then minor in frivolities. Where other countries are making impressive leaps to overcome economic, political, climate and sociocultural challenges, these individuals are either neck-deep in pursuing policies that reinforce their nefarious inclinations or ones that do not benefit ordinary people. For instance, some countries have legalized the idea that political officeholders are immune to accountability actions when they have violated the offices where they are meant to protect the public interest. Regardless of the amount they have embezzled, it seems they cannot be called into question by the necessary security agencies to protect them. This is odd. The economically powerful countries of the world do not attain this feat through this deplorable process.
Professor Moghalu and I think many people across the world believe that the foundational problem that faces Africa is a leadership problem because not only does everything that concerns a nation go directly to the table of the leader, but it is also true that the ability to initiate innovative programs and policies, with the accompanying power of implementation, resides with the leaders. And then, any leader who develops anxiety towards a politically and economically liberated citizen would always be bereft of ideas that could ordinarily transform the collective society. In their inchoate desire to be regarded as an authority or cling to power as long as possible, they would be disconcerted by the thought that the groups of people they otherwise lord over would become liberated and then undermine their authority. That feeling indicates their inability to evolve and understand the dynamics of things in their time. Although they could become very successful in this domain, they would create a generation of people who have no idea how to move their nation forward. And regardless of how an individual remains and dies as a powerful individual when problems come knocking, they would not be insulated from the consequences of their limited foresight. A troubled citizenry in chaos does not differentiate between influential and less powerful people. When they strike, they would ultimately do so with disregard for anyone’s status. Professor Moghalu admits there are system-designed economic challenges, but he reiterated that they won’t come in a situation with purposeful leadership.
Something important to note in the conversation between Professors Moghalu and Nimi Wariboko is that both must examine what is fundamental for a leader to do when they come to power. To Wariboko, systemic foundations are nonnegotiable in changing people’s attitudes to social and political responsibilities, but Moghalu takes a different approach. We have been familiar with the contrasting views. Some individuals believe that by having the right leaders in the correct position, the people’s actions will be influenced. To be honest, such ideologues are accurate because when people of good moral character are placed in leadership positions, they use their ethical principles and strength to provoke a change. However, that thinking is defeated by the understanding that people’s moral character barely affects the company, groups, and the body of people they work with. Leaders are naturally expected to work with an endless number of people with whom they often do not share personal relationships. Even if such a leader has a glistering moral identity, they cannot determine what happens in different ministries, departments, and aspects of leadership where very sensitive decisions would be made and would affect the collective progress of the people. More importantly, you cannot guarantee that good leaders will always come to power every time. If this one is good, the following five successors may not have a similar moral view.
Interestingly, systemic changes can happen when the right systems are installed among people. Systems from time have often been compelling in shaping a people’s character to responsibilities. It has been recognized as regulating people’s behavior even when they do not want to. The reluctance of leaders in Asian countries, especially China and maybe North Korea, to steal public money comes from the awareness that the consequences of their actions are immediate. Rather than shielding the corrupt ones among them and preventing them from answering to their actions, they have systems that would generally make them accountable and show them the consequences of their actions. Does this mean that they do not have corrupt officials amongst them? No. Does that mean abuse of offices would not be found there? No. These would be encountered at a minimal level. In essence, it is very fundamental to install the right systems and empower them to make decisions that they consider great for the advancement of society. While this is germane, it is also essential that they install people with admirable moral principles in offices who would also not compromise the ethical standards of the system and not soil its integrity.
This is the final report on the interview on “African Leadership” with Dr. Kingsley Moghalu on January 19, 2025. For the transcript:
By Felix Oboagwina
Comrade, Congratulations ooo!
What’s up, Man? Why are you congratulating me? It’s not my birthday till September.
You should also tell me congratulations nevertheless!
I really need good news. What happened? Why are we exchanging congratulations?
Petrol price has dropped from four digits to three digits. Shame on doubting Thomases like you! Petrol is no longer N1,200; it is now N925.
Continue to be self-delusional! News flash: All petrol stations in this our neighbourhood are still displaying N1,045 per litre.
They will adjust their meters downwards, latest, tomorrow morning. Hooray!
Hooray kill you there! You know what is worrying you and most Nigerians?
Tell us o, Mister Doubting Thomas. What is “wronging” with us?
Stockholm Syndrome! You have been raped for so long that you have fallen in love with your rapist.
Asusu beke! Oyinbo! Mister Grammarian: Which one is Stockholm Syndrome? Let me Google it. Here it is: Stockholm Syndrome is a psychological theory that explains why hostages or victims may develop positive feelings towards their captors or abusers. This can lead to the victim defending or identifying with the captor, and may also include negative feelings towards authorities attempting to rescue them. The term originated from a 1973 bank robbery in Stockholm, Sweden, where hostages developed an emotional bond with their captors instead of being hostile.
You Nigerians will celebrate a little gain from your oppressors when you have lost so, so much. Before your hero took over power on May 29, 2023, the price of petrol was N195. Then, someone opened his big mouth, waaaah, and said: SUBSIDY IS GONEYou! No strategy! No modus operandi! No incentive! No structure! Nothing! Before you could say JACK ROBINSON, predictably, the price reacted and fuel skyrocketed to N550 per litre. Today they sell for N1,045 minimum! Then these same Shylocks shave off less than N100 from that bogus price and you wave your tails like starving dogs handed a meatless bone.
What is wrong with celebrating what you call “little gains?”
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