Opinion
Reforming Higher Education In Africa
Published
3 months agoon
By Toyin Falola
On November 4, 2024, I will address the faculty and students of Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria, on the future of higher education. My gratitude goes to Professor Biodun Ogunyemi, who facilitated the invitation. Last May, we assembled a competent and courageous team of educators in Kenya to offer cogent guidelines on this important topic needed to transform Africa. At Olabisi Onabanjo University, I will continue with this conversation. In this pre-lecture release, I take the conversation to one of the preeminent stakeholders: the parents, politicians, and administrators.
A few weeks ago in Nigeria, a video emerged of an X user, identified as Bello Galadanchi, who refurbished a classroom in Northern Nigeria with 4.1 million naira. Before then, he had been preceded by popular philanthropist and content creator, Asherkine, who has accomplished a similar feat deep in the mountainous regions of Plateau State. The same period has witnessed a school closure at Nigeria’s premier tertiary institution, the University of Ibadan, following protests over fee hikes by the students. All these point to one thing—the education system is in serious peril. And it is not just in Nigeria. Research suggests that sixty per cent of children aged 15 to 17 are not enrolled in school in Africa, with only nine per cent enrolment level in higher education compared to the global average of forty-two per cent.
The United Nations also states that around forty to fifty per cent of graduates are unable to find employment, resulting in a mismatch between the job market and available workforce. This spells bleak prospects for the continent as the bulk of its population are young people. Other nuanced challenges exist in the form of underwhelming levels of girl-child enrolment in schools, funding for tertiary institutions, and investment in research by national governments, among others. I discuss these challenges in the following section, with a view to submitting approaches to reforming higher education in Africa. The focus areas will be curriculum quality, access and equity, funding, and governance.
Another major challenge that higher education in Africa faces is the quality of the curriculum. Many African universities do not offer the ‘best’ education, not because of only the shortage of infrastructures and resources or the absence of qualified workers but because of the quality of our curricula. The graduates are generally not employable, and hence, the skills in the nation’s workforce are low. Furthermore, the curricula of not only a few African universities are simply not in tune with the job market demand, thereby making the skills of graduates irrelevant. The curriculum is the blueprint of a formal institution; scholars consider it vital to the development of the ‘best’ student who is ready and fully equipped to make meaningful contributions to society.
This largely differentiates the formal education system from informal education as the latter is more inclined to follow a less systematic pattern with a limited focus on timelines and core learning objectives. The demarcated nature of curricula makes them fundamentally predictive frameworks that signpost the growth and development of individual students at diverse stages. What this implies is that a close study of the guides for building learners should typically supply crucial insights into the level of exposure they have obtained and the expectations that the outside world, or employers, more specifically, may expect from them. However, the African case presents a puzzling situation as the existence of curricula with the appearance of innovativeness does not immediately indicate high-quality instruction—that is, even when such curricula are present in the first place.
Foundational to the development of learning frameworks in the African educational psyche are the inputs of colonialists in the design and structure of scholarly training. The implication of this is that the more immediate interests of colonisers were prioritised over any benefits an education system should naturally repose in its absorbers. Africans were better equipped for clerical functionalities than the intricacies of self-government, such as economic planning, nation-building as informed by pluralistic sociological contexts, and road-mapping technological advancements for international competitiveness. This integration of intellectual subservience into the educational architecture meant that African countries such as South Africa and Nigeria had to react by outrightly seeking to overhaul their curricula in protests against their overlords’ self-interests. In South Africa, this took the shape of a recalibration of the education provided to the black majority, given its failure to comprehend the diversities and nuances existent in the country’s social fabric. In Nigeria, the curriculum overhaul focused on ascertaining preferred learning outcomes on a context-by-context basis. Some of the evident changes were the introduction of new subjects, such as the study of Geography, French, and History.
Notwithstanding, while the people responsible for the design of colonialist curricula in the first instance have progressed from their decades-old templates, echoes of the historical heritage remain today. Researchers have argued variously for a need to decolonise African education curricula to tackle the burdens of a fast-paced, technologically driven world.
Moreover, the challenges of modern Africa have been submitted as demanding an Africanised, local approach to achieving resolution. I have chosen to intersect seamlessly with these debates through work to establish interest in a field known as African Ancestral Studies. The mentality behind my efforts and those of other scholars invested in this derives from assessments that uncover the unconscious impacts of Westernised models of thought on the minds of the colonised. This reflects itself in the problem-solving techniques adopted by leaders and followers who, despite existing in a unique cultural environment, still import fixes to native problems.
Aside from indoctrination into the mores of the oppressor, language has proven to be one very important way of reorganising the thought-forming patterns of a person’s mind. Language dictates the attitude of individuals towards the world, other people, and their ecosystem at large. It outlines standards of engagement based on set societal principles. Thus, a student trained exclusively in using British forms of address may find ‘sir’ and other aspects of the politeness lexicon a way to interact with elders and superiors. On the other hand, more symbolic gestures or physical movements are considered more culturally appropriate and suitable for other persons whose adaptation to their society has either been entirely informed by traditional instruction or constitutes a predominant aspect of it.
A concise explanation of the role of indigenisation or culturally competent education lies in the Arab world, where the more liberal of the Western world are compelled to conduct themselves in keeping with the expectations of society. There, the norms of speech, conflict resolution, kinship, romantic relationships, nation-building, businesses, and governance are born out of the injunctions of religious texts and practices evolved and inculcated through centuries of historical progression. Arguably, this has worked out well for them. The African curriculum differs in that it is resistant to practical, realistic change and persists in channelling the impulses of its colonial ideators. This manifests itself in focus on instructions in the theoretical ambits of course contents without pragmatic applications of these skills. In Nigeria, for example, the phrases la-cram and la-pour are very popular in the vocabulary of Nigerian tertiary students, one that is quite interesting and also learned as far back as their secondary school days. This is because of the educators’ emphasis on the rigid assimilation of taught subjects with extremely tight manoeuvring space for creativity and critical reflection. If anything, students who venture to think outside predetermined boxes are punished rather than rewarded by their instructors who, likely due to a sense of insecurity or conservativeness, cannot contrive novel, radical approaches to doing things. This teaching method is also evident in students’ delivery of academic projects where they are typically not encouraged to explore fresh perspectives in research. The contrast with teaching techniques in the Western world is noticeable as new African entrants to European or American classrooms will find themselves faced with instructors who encourage conversation and two-way criticism of academic content. This structure spurs the students’ interest in their course and inherently fosters a culture of debate that impacts society in the long run.
Through this analysis, we come to realise that not only do African scholars and teachers need a break from tendencies absorbed in the decades of colonialism, but they possess fairly equivalent faults, too. While I do not diminish the impact of colonial training, the cadre responsible for training students themselves tend to be detractors of new thinking. This is simply a situation of old wine filled into a new skin—the quality of the product remains the same. In environments where lecturers continue to utilise the same tried and tested methods for developing students, even if they are on new subjects, it is seriously doubtful that the perceptions of the students will transform so radically towards their classroom. For instance, if a new discourse were introduced on the subject matter of feminism, the body language, speech and mannerisms of the learning managers may still project misogyny, thereby doing little to impact the students beyond emphasising readiness for examinations.
Lack of quality training and reorientation for the trainers may also affect their attitudes to the subjects they are charged to teach. In the absence of these elements and performance metrics, continuous rewrites of curricula will not change the status quo.
Nevertheless, I do not excuse the impetus for revolutionising our academic standards to embody an indigenous outlook. There is a highly palpable erosion of values and familiarity with what is truly African in the present day. Across cities and rural environments, everything from architecture to fashion, speech and ideology are primarily imported from far across the Atlantic. To restore the importance of the African psyche, universities are exceedingly important places for kickstarting this movement.
Moving on, access to higher education in Africa remains limited, particularly for marginalised groups such as women, rural dwellers, and people with disabilities. Financial constraints, geographical barriers, and cultural norms can prevent many individuals from pursuing higher education. According to data from the United Nations, only four out of every one hundred African children are expected to pursue a graduate or post-graduate education compared to thirty-six in Latin America and fourteen in South and West Asia. The driving factors are intricate, as while students face inequities in financial constraints, geographical and social reasons also challenge them. In effect, students who reside in distant, hard-to-reach locations may not only be barred from obtaining a higher education but may also be prevented from schooling up to the secondary school level in the first instance. The effect is that only a fraction of students who are age-qualified for secondary school are enrolled, and an even smaller number in tertiary institutions. Equity is also strained along gender lines due to long-held views of girl-child education in some of the more conservative regions of the continent.
There are perceptions that it is more strategic for female children to be committed to fetching income from early marriages for their low-income families than being sent to school where costs will be incurred for their fees. An additional barrier to girl-child education is that in cases where female children are educated, they are forced to deal with the difficulties of period poverty in schools that are frequently ill-equipped to handle it and families that are either too poor or under-educated to minimise their burden. The challenge with access extends to people living with disabilities who are doubly faced with the costs of care and disability-friendly infrastructure in higher institutions. Though laws exist to mitigate these issues in countries such as Nigeria, they have yet to transform into phenomenal change at the scale necessary to remove barriers. Worse still, poverty continues to be a major determiner of the academic outcomes of African students, with data revealing that a high of fifty-four per cent of sub-Saharan Africans are very concerned about paying school fees. In countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, school fees are frequently documented as a major financial worry, with sixty per cent of adults attesting to this fact in Uganda.
This is quite expected due to the high burdens of poverty in many African countries. Though programmes have been implemented to guarantee access to education for children, ancillary expenses such as transport costs, uniforms, and stationery, among multiple other hidden costs, prohibit an uptick in education levels. It is, therefore, not farfetched to reason that the same problems inhibiting educational access at elementary levels would substantially prune the population of students trickling into the higher education system. Previously, students across Africa have protested the high costs of education. South Africa was a major protest that spread across universities in the country in response to a 10.5% increment in expenses. This was despite a perceived lack of corresponding increase in the quality of education delivery. In Nigeria, similar protests have been a theme of the higher education experience, resulting in school shutdowns in different institutions. The most recent effort by the government to finally pass on the costs of schooling to the population has seen nearly a hundred billion naira disbursed in loans under a scheme known as the Nigerian Education Loan Fund. It is not unusual to find sentiments portraying education as a public good among ordinary people. I do not believe they are incorrect, given the decades of economic deprivation and injustice that pervades many African countries. In the same vein, however, this limited access to higher education can perpetuate the very social and economic inequalities that complicate it, putting the continent on a problematic trajectory.
In a report, it was stated that the African Union failed to meet its Agenda 2063 targets on all accounts. This is despite the obvious benefit of forty-seven million fewer poor people by 2043 and a 368-billion dollar addition to its Gross Domestic Product. The problem may itself be inextricable from funding as many African universities rely heavily on tuition fees to stay afloat. This is not a condition unique to Africa, as similar challenges occur in the West. The catch, however, is the inability of parents and guardians to meet this demand. Aside from shutting out lower-income households, compensation by decreasing the quality of education is a reliable fallback mechanism that universities may use in competing for students. Without government assistance to cushion the strain of maintaining infrastructural and staff quality, the natural consequences are unimpressive research and scholarly products. To make matters worse, laxity in governance stunts the development of African higher education. As expected, weak governance and accountability can lead to corruption, inefficiency, and a lack of transparency in any institution, the impact of which is the depletion of trust by staff and other patrons.
The Importance of Reforming Higher Education in Africa Higher education underpins economic growth, social development, and global competitiveness. In Africa, where faster urbanisation, technological change and globalisation present major challenges, higher education is essential. A strong higher education sector can promote innovation and entrepreneurship and equip students with the skills and capacities that drive economic growth. The World Bank shows that countries with higher levels of education tend to have higher per capita GDP. Because most countries in Africa – where a third of the world’s extremely poor live and struggling to transcend the demands of raw commodity dependency – are facing the imperious task of economic diversification and income increase to pull more of their people out of poverty, investment in higher education is one of the main strategic objectives. Higher education can contribute to social development, too. Access to higher education can reduce poverty, improve health outcomes and contribute to more socially just societies. Education can empower people to break out of the cycle of poverty and improve their livelihoods. Education has been linked to improved health, including reduced mortality and improved access to health services. Higher education can also promote social cohesion and tolerance by teaching students the value of intercultural exchange and critical thinking.
The quest for global competitiveness represents another compelling rationale, placing pressure on top governments to instigate meaningful reforms in higher education. Any country that wants to attract human talent, investments or markets in today’s globalising world must be able to create an enabling environment to facilitate competitive human potential. The rationale behind the argument is that the higher education sector serves as a tool for producing talent and human capital that will be competitive in the global arena. According to the African Development Bank, the evidence shows that school leavers in Africa lack the required talents to cope with a 21st-century work environment. Factors attributed to this crisis include a lack of emphasis on technical and vocational education, a lack of emphasis on soft skills development, a lack of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education, and a lack of entrepreneurship curricula. There is no doubt that higher education spurs innovation and entrepreneurship, both of which are vital to the creation of new industries that stimulate economic growth.
The change would include the establishment of a system of quality assurance frameworks and standards to ensure that universities deliver a quality education that promotes graduates who are innovative, creative, critical and pragmatic thinking problem solvers and citizens who can contribute to their respective economies; widening access of higher education to more disadvantaged groups through scholarships, bursaries and affirmative action policies; increased budget allocations to government institutions of higher education and accessing alternative sources of funding such as endowments and businesses partnerships; strengthening institutions of higher education governance and accountability to ensure fiscal discipline and transparency; and fostering south-south and co-operation between universities in Africa and those in the global north to promote the exchange of ideas and expertise and strengthen institutions. In this way, countries in Africa could repurpose their institutions to be agents of economic growth, social transformation and global competitiveness. This would be a major undertaking, not to be viewed lightly. Reforming higher education is a complex, multifaceted, and sustained effort that demands the collective contribution of government, universities, and other stakeholders.
Notwithstanding, Africa has its examples of success stories in higher education reform, suggesting that the idea of success is not futile after all. The first notable example is South Africa’s higher education reform agenda. South Africa has successfully implemented a series of reforms that have targeted improved access to equitable and quality higher education. These reforms include the formation of two major policies: the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) and the National Qualifications Framework (NQF). The NSFAS was adopted by the South African Government in 1992 after an intense debate in post-Apartheid South Africa about how to improve access to education for the poor, previously excluded black majority from higher learning institutions. Through the NSFAS reforms, the government introduced scholarships and bursaries to support underprivileged students in their quest to pursue tertiary education. Bursaries are targeted to assist students with extraordinary financial handicaps, while scholarships focus on economically challenged students. One consequence of this policy is that South Africa has been able to sustain a mounting increase in the number of students in higher learning institutions. The NQF was aimed at building on and entrenching learning experience into a unified framework for all employees, employers and the education-policy-making arm of the government.
Kenya has also followed this path in its way, through what could be described as a local variant of the ‘glocal’ model – which gives us the era of policies such as expanding access to higher education through the opening of new public universities: since the 2000s, government and private universities have grown by fifty-two per cent; its Commission on University Education, established in 2012, is in charge of accreditation and quality assurance of its universities. Most simply, the opportunities for building new academic structures should be seized, considering the needs of the local environment and the continent. All these changes deserve constant monitoring and re-evaluation.
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We Listen, We Don’t Judge
By Felix Oboagwina
Comrade, Congratulations ooo!
What’s up, Man? Why are you congratulating me? It’s not my birthday till September.
You should also tell me congratulations nevertheless!
I really need good news. What happened? Why are we exchanging congratulations?
Petrol price has dropped from four digits to three digits. Shame on doubting Thomases like you! Petrol is no longer N1,200; it is now N925.
Continue to be self-delusional! News flash: All petrol stations in this our neighbourhood are still displaying N1,045 per litre.
They will adjust their meters downwards, latest, tomorrow morning. Hooray!
Hooray kill you there! You know what is worrying you and most Nigerians?
Tell us o, Mister Doubting Thomas. What is “wronging” with us?
Stockholm Syndrome! You have been raped for so long that you have fallen in love with your rapist.
Asusu beke! Oyinbo! Mister Grammarian: Which one is Stockholm Syndrome? Let me Google it. Here it is: Stockholm Syndrome is a psychological theory that explains why hostages or victims may develop positive feelings towards their captors or abusers. This can lead to the victim defending or identifying with the captor, and may also include negative feelings towards authorities attempting to rescue them. The term originated from a 1973 bank robbery in Stockholm, Sweden, where hostages developed an emotional bond with their captors instead of being hostile.
You Nigerians will celebrate a little gain from your oppressors when you have lost so, so much. Before your hero took over power on May 29, 2023, the price of petrol was N195. Then, someone opened his big mouth, waaaah, and said: SUBSIDY IS GONEYou! No strategy! No modus operandi! No incentive! No structure! Nothing! Before you could say JACK ROBINSON, predictably, the price reacted and fuel skyrocketed to N550 per litre. Today they sell for N1,045 minimum! Then these same Shylocks shave off less than N100 from that bogus price and you wave your tails like starving dogs handed a meatless bone.
What is wrong with celebrating what you call “little gains?”
By Toyin Falola
The reelection of Donald Trump and his return to the White House on January 20, 2025, have spurred debates regarding the consequences this new chapter in the leadership of the United States could have for the state of international relations. Although many analysts are focused on how this change in power would affect trade, security, and environmental policies in the United States, there is also a parallel discussion on the effects on developing continents like Africa. Not surprisingly, officials, academics, and global strategists from many African nations are beginning to examine how a Trump-led new government might either reinterpret long-standing ties, challenge diplomatic norms, or bring fresh accords that redefine present inter-relations.
Trump’s first term, marked by a foreign policy favoring bilateral treaties over multilateral ones, has already caused cautious expectations among African leaders to be aroused. For decades, many African nations have been fostering a range of security and economic ties to the United States, with many of these alliances undergoing recalibrations that did not always benefit the continent. Trump’s one-sided view of trade, framed by the “America First” notion, deviates from his predecessors’ traditional approach.
African governments have aggressively sought various foreign partners over the past decade to increase the range of commercial and financial investment portfolios. China, Russia, Turkey, and the European Union are among the significant forces leaving their traces over the continent. This broad spectrum of interests has contributed to a crowded field where African states engage in diplomatic balancing acts—sometimes using rivalry among international powers to secure favorable agreements. Following Donald Trump’s victory, there has been a lot of speculation on how the US government would either choose to intensify its rivalry with China in African nations or pursue selective cooperation to help offset Beijing’s influence.
The uniquely personal approach of the Trump administration, where public comments might overnight alter the tone of a relationship, accentuated this sense of unease. Africans who follow US politics recall remarks referring to various countries on the continent in less than favorable terms that sparked general indignation and questions about whether such rhetoric foretold a more general policy move away from previously friendly connections. Critics claimed it was ready to give more obvious headline issues elsewhere top priority over African challenges. Some African officials responded by deciding to increase their interactions with other partners. China invests significantly in African infrastructure and resource extraction and has been the most apparent gainer of this recalibration. Russia also became more visible, particularly in arms purchases and security training; Turkey and the Gulf countries expanded their commercial presence in specific areas. Analysts hope for consistency in that inclination for one-on-one deals over broad multilateral commitments as the Trump White House prepares to retake the front stage.
Initially low on Trump’s agenda, the African Growth and Opportunity Act—which provides duty-free access for a range of goods—is under increasing debate among experts about whether it might be subjected to fresh scrutiny or even a significant overhaul forcing African nations to renegotiate on more reciprocal terms. Few would dispute that such conversations might be intimidating for smaller nations lacking the same negotiating power as more developed governments.
Simultaneously, nations with more substantial industrial and resource bases could use this climate to draw attention and investment, hoping to find deals granting them privileged access to American markets. These debates generally center on how Washington may compromise between lowering its overseas obligations and meeting its desire to compete with China.
Although Sino-American competition is now a theater for Africa, Trump’s approach thus far has been to attack Beijing more directly rather than devoting significant funds to match Chinese investments in freeways, train lines, or industrial parks throughout the continent. Under Trump, Washington would choose focused projects that support specific American economic or security goals instead of massive infrastructure schemes, maybe emphasizing strategic minerals, oil reserves, or technologically driven sectors. African countries that find those industries needing finance, knowledge, or technology support can profit from this strategy. Still, whether the second Trump government will seek to create more appealing frameworks for African growth or try to limit Chinese entry is unclear.
The field of security cooperation generates particularly strong conjecture. While openly expressing an intention to lower the total military presence worldwide, the Pentagon did retain or even increase some operations against terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab in Somalia during Trump’s previous term.Increased drone strikes and special operations in various conflict areas sparked discussions on whether such tactics enhanced long-term stability or only served to limit threats for a given period. Though experts advise a closer mix of economic and humanitarian aid to solve the underlying causes of extremism, observers predict that the trend will continue. Some African leaders worry that a laser focus on military action could eclipse important initiatives aiming at social services, government reforms, and young employment.
In the middle of this global emphasis, several analysts advise African countries to create a collective strategy that clearly and succinctly outlines their objectives for the next four years and sets their priorities. Depending on the situation, this could mean improving already-existing treaties or rewriting them under fresh conditions needing more African negotiator involvement. Establishing closer cooperation with colleagues from non-Western nations could also help guard against the volatility emanating from Washington. Should the second term of President Trump go in unexpected directions or impose policies on trade and aid that African governments find objectionable, this kind of preparedness could help offer a margin of stability.
Critics warn that depending too much on ad hoc solutions would expose African governments to abrupt policy changes or budgetary constraints.
Besides, many African analysts believe that a Trump-led White House might inspire Africa to engage in more coordinated initiatives on issues including continental free trade, intra-African tourism, and industrial policy cooperation. These people believe that if African countries see a decline in funding or an unclear commitment from the United States government, it might encourage a stronger push towards self-sufficiency and a stronger integration of the continent. Though the African Union has been pushing for such objectives for a reasonable time, there have been cases when real growth lags behind the rhetoric. Competing national interests, a restricted budget, and ongoing conflicts between neighboring nations have all contributed to this. Still, some believe that a resurrected Trump government—known for its unpredictable behavior and limited approach to involvement—would ironically give African leaders the shock they need to express themselves more firmly in their quest for unification. They argue that a more unified Africa would give the continent a stronger voice in international debates and shield it from the outside shocks that could arise whenever a dominant partner changes its course of action or withdraws some advantages.
Those focusing on economic alliances believe Africa is at a crossroads. Rapid urbanization, a rising young population, and untapped innovation ecosystems throughout the continent present rich ground for investment in various industries, from technology enterprises to agribusiness. American-based companies have occasionally shown a will to seize these possibilities, especially in countries that have invested in dependable broadband infrastructure and offer legal frameworks supporting global collaboration.
The Trump administration’s attitude toward lowering foreign aid and emphasizing financial returns over broad-based development may cause investors to prioritize profitable sectors like mining or oil over essential investments in education or healthcare. Critics of such a selective approach worry that it could lead to temporary economic bubbles, mainly benefiting a tiny number of elites while leaving normal people behind. Some critics warn about this danger here. Conversely, many people think that Trump’s inclination for haggling over large sums of money could inspire him to search for high-impact initiatives with quick access to clear benefits.
Under the former government, President Trump sought symbolic achievements he could support as proof of effective negotiations on a sporadic basis. If there is an apparent political or financial gain, this approach could match Africa’s significant resources and the appeal of modernizing initiatives. Conversely, people worry that with local businesses playing a secondary role, these agreements might be significantly biased to benefit American companies. Under this situation, many experts are reminded of a time when African countries had to adopt development targets determined by donors and often made significant concessions in return for projects involving industry or infrastructure. There is hope that as African nations keep growing and enhancing their strategic planning, they will become more aggressive and search for alliances with generally positive effects. Utilizing the development of jobs, the dissemination of technology, or the application of local content requirements guaranteeing genuine involvement from African firms, they could try to acquire community buy-in.
Beyond these more general policy issues, the African diaspora in the United States has become a powerful economic and cultural link influencing African impressions of American political events. Diaspora groups engage in local businesses, send billions of dollars in remittances to their own countries, and frequently travel back and forth to foster economic relations and entrepreneurial activity. Should Trump’s immigration posture tighten, African professionals or students may find it more difficult to sustain these flows, and that disturbance might reverberate throughout fields like healthcare to education. However, if history is anything to go by, the diaspora has shown resiliency despite tight visa policies and has found other paths to stay actively involved with hometowns. Whether the incoming government will recognize the increasing impact of the diaspora or carry on measures some believe to be obstacles to complete integration is yet unknown.
In popular culture, Africa’s deep ties with the United States have created a vibrant exchange of music, film, and digital content. Afro-beat has found devoted fans worldwide, including in American cities. Hollywood, for its part, has begun paying more attention to African audiences and themes. This cultural interplay does not halt when a new president takes office, though it can shift. Creative collaboration may slow if visa restrictions tighten or specific cultural exchange programs lose official support. Yet social media platforms have proven immensely effective in bridging gaps, allowing African creators to reach American fans without extensive institutional backing. As a result, cultural links often flourish despite political differences, and everyday people continue to forge relationships that bypass formal channels.
Those who see international diplomacy from a more expansive perspective believe the competitive conflict between the US and China will always influence African leaders’ stance. Already transforming skylines, port cities, and industrial zones are ambitious infrastructure projects Beijing supports. Should the American administration deepen or hasten its geopolitical challenge to China, it might give African cities a chance to negotiate better terms. Some viewers who see a future in which Africa can use big power rivalry to guarantee infrastructure improvements, technological transfers, and increased trade channels find that prospect exciting. Others warn that depending too much on one side of a geopolitical conflict could backfire should world powers change their approach or achieve compromise among themselves, therefore marginalizing lesser participants.
In countries grappling with internal conflicts, there is an immediate question of whether American involvement will remain consistent. Some regions rely on steady injections of US humanitarian aid, delivered through partnerships with international organizations, to keep people fed and to support medical facilities in war-torn zones. Should the new Trump administration decide to reduce these humanitarian allocations, local communities may face devastating resource gaps.Non-governmental organizations would need to seek alternative funders or cut programs entirely, leaving displaced populations even more vulnerable. Although a few commentators expect that core humanitarian efforts will persist, especially in crises that capture global headlines, they acknowledge that budgets can be reallocated in unpredictable ways.
At the same time, confident African entrepreneurs and innovators have expressed hope that the United States might favor building private-sector bonds over traditional development assistance. They argue that a business-driven model, though competitive, could promote self-sufficiency and job creation. If American investors look to Africa’s technology hubs for robust returns, this might spur the growth of local ecosystems in fields such as financial technology, e-commerce, and agricultural innovations. Cities like Cape Town and Kigali have drawn international attention for their blooming startup scenes. A second Trump presidency that prizes deal-making might well funnel resources into such areas, especially if they align with emerging US economic interests. Much will depend on whether policymakers in Washington sense an opportunity to nurture the private sector in Africa as an engine of mutual prosperity or whether they decide to clamp down on areas they perceive as less essential.
The most critical concern for ordinary people monitoring daily policy changes is ensuring that agreements developed between Washington and African capitals do not compromise local voices. In areas of the continent that are still experiencing epidemics or underfunded educational institutions, civil society organizations expect uphill challenges over sustaining financing for health and education activities. Humanitarian supporters fear what will happen to refugee populations should the government tighten its international assistance policy. Concurrent with this is a clear will among grassroots activists and non-governmental groups to create more resilient paths by looking for alternative funders or advocating for African governments to protect essential services independent of foreign budgetary decisions.
Inspired by local accomplishments and an administration in Washington that responds to apparent successes, several observers anticipate that new patterns of cooperation may develop during these next few years. The American government will consider whether African entrepreneurs create vibrant technology clusters or regional economic blocs to show that their markets can manage more manufacturing. That will enable Africa to be regarded as a real partner for substantial, mutually beneficial economic projects instead of seeing just through the prism of charity or security support. Though past efforts at such a rebranding have encountered challenges, the convergence of Africa’s dynamic demography, digital development, and global awareness of its potential could generate the impetus needed even though this potential is tempered by the understanding that Trump’s policies might also hinder progress if they result in sudden limits on travel, if they remove essential money for development efforts, or if they reinforce unfavorable perceptions about the continent. Primarily, if harsh language is used once more in the discourse, this worst-case scenario could create an atmosphere of mistrust between the African public and the United States of America. The continent is keeping a close eye on the situation and is currently engaged in heated conversations over what the next four years will bring and the best way to react. Student organizations think tanks, corporate forums, and media outlets continue to get together to discuss, evaluate, and share new points of view on how to turn uncertainty into opportunity.
There is no definitive answer to the question of how to proceed. Africa is not a stage where larger nations merely act out their geopolitical moves; Africa has a lot of activity. There is a patchwork of countries that are resolute in pursuing a fairer share of global prosperity, and the future chapter in the presidency of the United States of America has the potential to either advance or hinder their aspirations. Even though African leaders and populations have developed since then and are now more equipped to deal with the unexpected, Trump’s second term will likely be almost identical to his first term regarding unforeseen twists and big announcements. If they successfully present their arguments within the halls of power and maintain their unwavering dedication to the community’s priorities, they may discover that even a turbulent administration can provide expansion opportunities. This option’s success is contingent on African states’ capacity to successfully coordinate their efforts, preserve social and political stability within their borders, and keep a watchful eye on the long game of ensuring sustained developmental growth.
As the dust settles on the presidential transition in the United States and attention switches to policy announcements from the White House, the ultimate decision regarding Trump’s reelection for Africa will be determined by what comes to fruition. It will interest observers to assess whether trade dialogues increase, whether or not security cooperation results in long-term peace rather than short bursts of activity, and whether or not cultural and educational linkages continue to exist despite any changes in regulatory policies.
When all is said and done, it will take some time to determine how the reinvigorated leadership of the United States under President Trump affects Africa’s march toward greater integration, stronger economies, and more resilient societies. On the other hand, Africa’s trajectory increasingly reflects its vitality and goals, and Washington’s role is simply one piece of the complex puzzle that is Africa’s overall trajectory. Because of this sense of agency, many people continue to have hope. Visionaries resolute in their pursuit to redefine their continent’s position in the international arena are the driving force behind Africa’s success, even in the face of global power maneuvers, local setbacks, or uncertain signals from a new administration. Africa is ready to be not just a beneficiary of decisions about foreign policy but also an influential player influencing worldwide trends. Their voices will shape the discourse as these next four years unfold, reminding the world that Africa is poised to be both receiving and shaping international trends.
Any individual who is committed to a global system that is more just and balanced will find this aim to be resonant. The countries that make up the continent should closely monitor the situation, express their opinions, and adjust as required. By acting in this manner, they are reinforcing the fact that the future of Africa is no longer solely dependent on the desires of a foreign superpower, and the stage is set for a new phase in which Africa and the United States will recalibrate their connections within a bigger and more complex global context. Although nothing can be assured, there is ample room for optimism.
Please join us for a panel discussion with our distinguished panelists, Professors Christopher Isike, Kingsley Makhubela, Ayisah Osori, and Carl LeVan, who will be sharing their expertise on “President Trump and Africa”:
Sunday, January 26, 2025
10 AM Austin // 5 PM Nigeria // 6 PM South Africa
. Falola is Extraordinary Professor of Political Science, University of Pretoria.
By Hope O’Rukevbe Eghagha
Banji: A speaker speaks no more!
Rita: How poetic! How dramatic!
Uyi: How decisive! Now there will be peace in the world!
Rita: Excuse me. Now you are being sarcastic!
Uyi: In a world of absurdities, it is sarcasm that keeps one sane!
Rita: It has been poetic to me, anyway. That’s my opinion.
Banji: What is poetic? The language or the experience?
Rita: Both, I believe. Lessons in hubris. The power of power, the failure of power. The wheel came full circle for a man consumed by innate arrogance.
Banji: One of the lessons of power. A recurring one.
Rita: But man never seems to learn. He has always been a victim of pride and will continue to be forever and ever.
Uyi: But you have both joined the bandwagon and pronounced the man guilty without giving him fair hearing. Why was he impeached while he was away to the United States?
Banji: Hahahaha! To reduce bloodshed, perhaps, you know! To prevent counter forces from laying an ambush.
Rita: Does it matter really?
Banji: But speaking seriously, why didn’t Strongman Mudasiru Obasa get wind of his impending fall and rally his troops?
Rita: He was strong only when the forces of power allowed him to be. This, he didn’t realize. Now, he can’t disburse any largesse. His visitors will be very few now.
Rita: Besides, did he have troops? I think he had offended too many people in the long ten years in power, from June 2015 to January 2025. He is alleged to have routinely disrespected the governor.
Uyi: He must have been a fool if he did that. State-appointed or elected officials must know the difference between the man and the office. The occupant is a tenant, but the seat is forever. A Speaker who disrespects the Governor disrespects the people, disrespects the entire Executive branch of government.
Okoro: Then why did he last for so long in that position?
Banji: Very many reasons. He was simply indulged by the powerful persons in government. The report is that when he offended the inner caucus of the governance in the state, he had to go. It is said that on the cabinet list last presented by the governor, he pushed, shoved, blocked, and shook up the list until they made concessions. He even initially rejected a candidate who was backed by Abuja.
Uyi: In my view, if a man is accused of an offence, he must be given the opportunity to defend himself according to the articles of impeachment.
Banji: Impeachment is essentially a political process; not a legal one. That is to say, once the establishment declares you unfit, they will cook, manufacture, import, and concoct reasons to get you out. Fair hearing is not part of the bargain!
Rita: Let us consider all the impeachments in our nation’s history, starting from Alhaji Balarabe Musa’s experience in 1981 in the Second Republic. Balarabe Musa was in an impossible position because the House of Assembly was NPN-dominated while he was in PRP. They could not agree on a list of Commissioners. To throw him out, he was accused of corruption though that man was above board. Ayo Fayose in 2006, Peter Obi in 2006, Joshua Dariye in 2006, Oyo State governor Rashidi Ladoja in 2006, Bayelsa State Diepreye Alamieyeseigha in 2005, and Murtala Nyako of Adamawa state 2014 were all victims of impeachment.
Okoro: Since 1999, about sixteen deputy governors have been impeached in Nigeria also. From Lagos state we have Femi Pedro and Kofoworola, Iyiola Omisore (Osun) Chris Ekpenyong (Akwa Ibom), Abiodun Aluko and Biodun Olujimi (Ekiti) Garba Gadi (Bauchi). Phillip Shaibu was the 17th deputy governor to be impeached in Nigeria once he fell out with the incumbent governor.
Rita: Lagos is now on the list of twenty states where speakers have been impeached since 1999. Victor Idoro in Edo State was removed in 2016 by 16 of 24 members. He had been accused of highhandedness. Significantly he was replaced by a female speaker. Frank Okiye of Edo state in 2020), Rita Madunagu of Anambra in 2018, Adamu Musa of Niger State in 2015, and Goni Ali Modu of Borno state in 2012. In 2021, Abok Ayuba was impeached by 16 out of 24 legislators in Plateau state, Abubakar Ibrahim of Gombe state in 2020. In Delta state, Victor Ochei was removed in 2014 while Monday Igbuya faced the music in 2017. A couple of others were impeached from office. So, it’s not new.
Uyi: You have become an expert in the history of impeachments!
Rita: Hahahahaha! I’m a journalist, so, I should know.
Okoro: Impeachments have nothing to do with justice. It is a political weapon that is deployed to get rid of a political liability. Period.
Banji: Loyalty is important in politics in Nigeria.
Okoro: Loyalty my foot! What the Nigerian politician calls loyalty is spurious. It means a mentee or political associate must not hold views that are contrary to the position of so-called godfathers. You will run into problems if you display ambitions not supported by the big oga. The gist around town is that Obasa felt he was strong enough to aspire to the Lagos throne without the support of the powers-that-be.
Banji: A speaker speaks no more!
Rita: How are the mighty fallen!
Uyi: The state governor has distanced himself from the impeachment saga. Claims that the House did its own plans.
Banji: Tell that to the marines. There is no way a speaker can be impeached without the knowledge and consent of the state governor. A consensus must have been reached in conjunction with the Jagaban in Abuja before the exercise.
Rita: Whatever they do, they must remember the masses, the ordinary people of the state who need support. Impeachments will not tar the streets. Impeachment will not put food on the table. Impeachment will not increase power supply. Impeachment will not give hope to the poor. It is an intraclass struggle which the real owners of the state will not benefit from. I rest my case!
Banji: Gbam! Your case is well rested!
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